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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST - CLAYTON ACT - MERGER FOUND To LESSEN
COMPETITION WITHIN THE MEANING OF AMENDED SECTION 7.-
Defendant, Brown Shoe Company, appealed from a decision of the
United States District Court' which held that a merger between
the defendant and G. R. Kinny Company, Inc. was a violation of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act as it was amended in 1950.2 At
the time of the merger, Brown was the nation's fourth largest shoe
manufacturer (producing 4% of the nation's shoes) and the third
largest seller of shoes by dollar volume. Kinney, the nation's
twelfth largest shoe manufacturer (0.5%) was also the eighth
largest retailer of shoes by dollar volume (1.2%). In affirming
the district court's decision, the Supreme Court held that the merger
would (1) prevent those manufacturers who competed with Brown
from selling to Kinney's retail outlets, and (2) would tend to
substantially lessen competition in the retailing of men's, women's
and children's shoes. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
Section 7, as amended, provides that:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the . . . stock or other share capital and no corporation . . .
shall acquire . . . the assets of another corporation . . . where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such ac-
quisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly.3
The amendment made two changes in the original section 7.4
First, the original section did not prohibit the acquisition of assets.
Second, the lessening of competition in original section 7 referred
only to the competition between the parties to the merger. Thus,
amended section 7 provided a new standard as well as a new
prohibition.
To determine whether an alleged anti-competitive act will have
an undesirable effect upon competition, a court must define the
1 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959). This case went directly to the
Supreme Court from the district court under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 63
Stat. 107 (1949), 15 U.S.C. §28 (1958), amending 32 Stat. 823 (1903).264 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
3 64 Stat. 1125-26 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
438 Stat. 731 (1914); see MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON AcT(1959), for a discussion of these changes.
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relevant market and the standard of illegality. It must define the
relevant market because the effect of the merger upon competition
must be "within the area of effective competition." 5 (Relevant
market.) A standard of illegality must be established because that
standard must have been violated for the act to be branded
illegal.
In attempting to ascertain the limits of the relevant market
and the standard of illegality, different courts have used different
methods of approach. The Brown Shoe decision was significant
because it represented the Supreme Court's first attempt to apply
these existing methods to amended section 7.6
The relevant market consists of both the product market ("line
of commerce") and the geographic market ("section of the coun-
try"). In United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,7
the Court's determination of the product market was the key to its
decision. Although the defendant produced 75% of the nation's
cellophane, the Court held that it was not monopolizing interstate
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 of the Sherman Act"
because buyers often substituted different flexible packing materials
for cellophane. Also, the price of cellophane responded quickly
to increases and decreases in the prices of other materials. The
product market, therefore, was found to consist of all flexible
packing materials. Thus, the Court utilized first, product inter-
changeability and second, cross-elasticity of demand (price re-
sponsiveness) to define the market. It must be noted, however,
that the relationship of product interchangeability to the product
market was qualified. Before permitting one product to be sub-
stituted for another, a court had to be convinced that the character-
istics and uses of the products were similar. Thus, bricks could
not be substituted for steel simply because both were building
materials.9
In the following year, du Pont was again before the Supreme
Court.10 Its acquisition of General Motors stock was deemed to
be a violation of the original Section 7 of the Clayton Act since,
5 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593(1957). (Emphasis added.)6 Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362
U.S. 458 (1960) and Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. United States, 187 F.
Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mer., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) were based, in
part, on § 7. However, the Supreme Court, in deciding the issues, did
not discuss the scope and purposes of the 1950 amendment.
7351 U.S. 377 (1956).
8 "Every . . . combination . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . .
is hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1958).
9 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393
(1956).10 United States v. E. I. du Point de Nemours & Co., supra note 5.
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as a result of the acquisition, du Pont provided General Motors
with 67% of its automobile finishes requirements. Here again the
decision was based to a great extent upon the product market.
However, instead of emphasizing the concept of interchangeability
as it had done in The Cellophane Case, the Court stressed the
fact that "automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficient peculiar
characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently
distinct from all other finishes and fabrics . , . Thus, the
product market was a narrow one.
As a result of the du Pont-General Motors decision, govern-
ment prosecutors urged that the product market in section 7
cases should consist of only the products manufactured by the
merging companies; that product interchangeability and cross-
elasticity of demand were not relevant.' 2  This contention was
rejected by the Third Circuit in Erie Sand & Gravel Company v.
FTC,13 an amended section 7 proceeding. There, the defendant
and the corporation whose stock it had acquired both marketed
lake sand (dredged from Lake Erie). Instead of limiting the
product market to lake sand, the Court utilized inteichange-
ability and found the market to consist of lake sand as well
as bank sand (dredged from river banks).
Another concept of production flexibility' 4 is analogous to
product interchangeability, both in meaning and in the varying
degrees to which courts have used it in determining the limits
of the product market. Its meaning may be illustrated where a
vertical merger between manufacturer and retailer has taken place.
Because of the merger, other manufacturers may no longer be
able to sell product X to the retailer. However, if they are able
to produce product Y instead of X without inconvenience and
expense, the effect of the merger will no longer be considered
harmful. Production flexibility was an important factor in United
"1 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1957).
12 See Handler & Robinson, A Decade Of Administration Of The Celler-
Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLUm. L. Rnv. 629, 645 (1961).
13291 F2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961); see International Boxing Club, Inc. v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959), a case arising under the Sherman Act
in which both the du Pont-Cellophane and the du Pont-General Motors cases
were cited. From this the inference may be drawn that the Court would
use either the du Pont-Cellophane or the du Pont-General Motors concep-
tion of product market in a Sherman Act or Claytbn Act situation. See
also United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) where the product market consisted of all television programs as
opposed to only movies shown on television. See Handler & Robinson,
supra note 12, at 645.
14 For a comprehensive treatment of production flexibility see Mann &
Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Two
New Cases-Two New Views, 47 VA. L. REv. 1014 (1961).
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States v. Columbia Steel Co.15 where the product market was held
to consist of all rolled steel products rather than any individual
product. It was found that steel factories could produce any
rolled steel product with little additional expense. However, in
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,1" an amended section 7
proceeding, the district court dismissed production flexibility as
"indeed pure theory." 17
As indicated previously, the geographic market must also be
defined in order to ascertain the relevant market. Here too,
courts vary in determining the weight to be given to different
factors which comprise the geographic market, although all of the
factors are not always employed. Thos*e elements which have
been used to establish the boundaries of the geographic market
are: (1) transportation costs; 1 (2) the areas in which com-
peting manufacturers market their products 19 as opposed to the
area in which a buyer may be located ;20 (3) the areas in which
the parties to the merger compete; 21 and (4) the qualities or
characteristics of the products involved.22  One problem that may
exist with regard to the application of these factors is illustrated
in the Erie Sand & Gravel case. Although the product market
was found to consist of lake sand and bank sand, the government
urged that bank sand had to be excluded from the geographic
market. Because the cost of shipping sand was high, it would
be difficult for one who dredged lake sand to sell to a buyer
whose location was close to one who dredged bank sand. For this
reason, little or no competition existed between those who sold
each type of sand.
Upon completing its determination of the relevant market, the
court must turn its attention to the standard of illegality. In an
amended section 7 proceeding, this requires an understanding of
the statutory words: "where ... the effect ... may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 23
In the Clayton Act, the language of section 7 is similar to
that of section 3,24 making it necessary to examine the meanings
15334 U.S. 495 (1948).
16 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
17 Id. at 592.
1 8 Erie Sand & Gravel Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1961).
19 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
20 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
21American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1958); cf. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F.
Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953).22 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
23 64 Stat. 1125-26 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). (Emphasis added.)
24"[I]t shall be unlawful . . . to . . . make a sale or contract for sale
of goods . . . -on the condition . . . that the . . . purchaser thereof shall
not use . . . the goods . . . of a competitor . . . where the effect . . .
[ VOL. 37
RECENT DECISIONS
that have been attached to these words in section 3 proceedings..2 5
In Standard Fashion Co. v. Margrane -Houston Co.,26 a contract
between the petitioner and respondent provided that the respondent
would sell only the petitioner's fashion patterns to its customers.
In deciding whether this contract violated Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, the Supreme Court felt that this Act was designed to reach
a trend toward monopoly in its incipiency. On the other hand,
the Sherman Act could only be applied to antitrust practices after
they reached monopoly proportions. Nevertheless, the defendant's
contract with the plaintiff did not violate section 3. In reaching
this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the meaning of "may be
to substantially lessen" was more than the "mere possibility" that
competition would lessen. It meant that the contract must "probably
lessen" competition.
27
More recently, however, in Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States,28 Mr. Justice Frankfurter took a different approach.
The market for gasoline and automobile accessories in a seven
state geographical market was a large one. Through requirement
contracts with retailers, Standard Oil controlled 6.7% of this
market. This meant that a considerable part of a large market
had been foreclosed to the defendant's competitors -that com-
petitive activity had already substantially lessened. It then became
unnecessary to consider what future effects on competition Standard
Oil's requirement contracts might have. Thus, on the basis of this
purely quantitative standard of illegality, the defendant was found
to have violated section 3.
Cases which have arisen under original Section 7 of the Clayton
Act also reflect divergent interpretations of the standard of illegality.
International Shoe Co. v. FTC29 employed two means for as-
certaining the standard. First, it examined the effect of the
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly
in any lihe of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
(Emphasis added.)
25Although Handler & Robinson in A Decade Of Administration Of
The Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act, 61 CoLu.m. L. REv. 629, 671-74 (1961)
feel that Congress did not intend that § 7 should be interpreted in the light
of §3, the Supreme Court in the Brown Shoe case indicated otherwise.
The Court stated: "Congress not only indicated that 'the tests of illegality
[under § 7] are intended to be similar to those . . . applied in interpreting
• . . other sections of the Clayton Act,' but also chose for § 7 language
virtually identical to that of § 3 ... " Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 329 (1962).26258 U.S. 346 (1922).
27But see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947) where the Court emphasized the fact that it made no difference
whether the trend "is a creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full
gallop. .. ."
28337 U.S. 293 (1949).
29280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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merger on the industry as a whole rather than on the competition
that existed solely between the two parties to the merger. It
concluded that "mere acquisition by one corporation of the stock
of a competitor, even though it result in some lessening of com-
petition, is not forbidden .... ,, 30 Second, the intent of the parties
to the merger was considered. The Court assumed that when
a failing company was acquired by a successful one, the latter
did not make the acquisition solely to increase its competitive
advantage. 31
In the du Pont- General Motors 32 case, however, the Court
bypassed Interrational Shoe and used a quantitative standard similar
to that of Standard Oil.33 It reasoned that the automobile market
was a large one and that General Motors held a substantial share
of that market. Through its holdings of General Motors stock,
du Pont supplied most of General Motors' requirements in auto-
mobile fabrics and finishes. Therefore du Pont competitors were
per se foreclosed from a substantial share of a substantial market.
However, in a recent determination of the standard of il-
legality of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Court in Tampa
Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.3 4 once again reversed its course.
It rejected the quantitative test and urged that consideration be
given to the "relative strength of the parties, the proportionate
volume of commerce involved in relation to the total volume of
commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable im-
mediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the
market might have on effective competition." 31
In deciding the Brown Shoe case, the Supreme Court assessed
the relevancy of the many factors that have been used to define
the market and the standard of illegality. Through an exhaustive
analysis of the legislative history of section 7, the Court drew
several conclusions which served as its frame of reference. It felt
that Congress feared corporate concentration and wished to pre-
serve small business.36 To accomplish this aim, section 7 would
have to arrest trends toward concentration in their incipiency.y7
Thus, as determined in Standard Fashions, the Court here decided
that a broader test than that used under the Sherman Act was
necessary. In the Court's view, the words "may tend sub-
30 International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930).
31 Id. at 301.
32United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586
(1957).
33 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293
(1949).
34365 U.S. 320 (1961).
35 Id. at 329.
36 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
37 Id. at 317-18.
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stantially" referred to "probabilities, not certainties. . . . Mergers
with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be proscribed... " 38
The Court also examined the condition of the shoe industry.
It found that two trends had gained momentum since 1950. First,
manufacturers were rapidly acquiring retail outlets, and second,
parent manufacturers were forcing these acquired retailers to sell
their shoes in increasing quantities.39
Against this frame of reference, consisting of congressional
intent and the existing trends of the shoe industry, the Court
weighed the vertical aspects of the merger (manufacturer to
retailer). It began with a determination of the relevant market,
composed of the product market and of the geographic market.
Product interchangeability and cross-elasticity of demand were
only relevant in determining the "outer boundaries" of the product
market. However, within these boundaries were more narrow
submarkets which, for section 7 purposes, could constitute separate
product markets or "lines of commerce." 40 Because men's, women's
and children's shoes were each recognized by the public and were
sufficiently distinct from one another, they comprised three separate
product markets.41
The geographic market of the vertical aspects of the merger
was the nation as a whole. It was evident that there was nation-
wide distribution of shoes because of consumer demand and the
ease with which shoes could be shipped from one area to another.42
After defining the relevant market, the Court dealt with the
standard of illegality. Contrary to the du Pont -General Motors
and Standard Oil cases, it was stated, with respect to the vertical
aspects, that "the percentage of the market foreclosed" from
manufacturers who competed with Brown for Kinney's market
was not a decisive factor.43  It then reasoned that Congress intended
to halt trends toward concentration in their incipiency and to
protect small business. Therefore the intent of the parties to the
merger and the trend in the shoe industry toward concentration
were of prime importance. 44  It was felt that Brown's purpose
was to introduce its shoes into Kinney stores. This intent, com-
38 Id. at 323.3 9 Id. at 301.4 0 Id. at 325.
41 The defendant voiced strong objection to these "lines of commerce."
It contended that since it produced medium-priced shoes and that Kinney
marketed low-priced shoes that it was incorrect to ignore these distinctions
by placing medium and low-priced shoes into the broader category of men's
shoes. However, the Court maintained that it was unrealistic to assume
that men's shoes priced below $8.99 occupied a different market from those
priced above $9.00. Id. at 326-28.42 id. at 328.
4 3 Id. at 329.
44 Id. at 332-33.
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bined with the fact that Kinney was not a "failing company"
and with the fact that there was a trend toward vertical integration
in the industry, caused the merger to be proscribed. For if the
trend remained unchecked, there would be a substantial lessening
of competition.
The Court then examined the horizontal aspects of the merger
(retailer to retailer)." Men's, women's and children's shoes were
again found to be separate "lines of commerce." However, the
relevant geographic market consisted of all cities with minimum
populations of ten thousand in which both Brown and Kinney had
retail outlets. "[J]ust as a product submarket may have section 7
significance as the proper 'line of commerce' so may a geographic
submarket be considered the appropriate 'section of the country.' "46
The geographic market simply had to be commercially realistic
and economically significant.
After making these observations, the Court weighed the effects
of the horizontal aspects of the merger to determine whether or
not the standard of illegality had been violated. Once more,
the trend toward concentration was an important factor in the
Court's mind. In addition, great consideration was given to the
share of the market controlled by Brown-Kinney. Their control
ranged from 5% of the children's shoes sold in Detroit to 57.7%
of the women's shoes sold in Dodge City, Kansas. 47 However,
the Court indicated that even if control in every city was only
5%, it might still be forced to dissolve the merger. Otherwise,
the trend toward concentration would result in an oligopoly.
Finally, because Brown was a national retail chain with integrated
manufacturing operations, it could "market [its] own brands at
prices below those of competing independent retailers. '48  Thus
competition might be substantially lessened.
It is evident that the Brown Shoe decision has iniected tre-
mendous breadth into section 7. The Court has served notice
that corporations which control relatively small portions of a
competitive industry are not immune to section 7. Brown man-
ufactured 4% of the nation's shoes and was only one of 970 man-
ufacturers. It will be possible to apply section 7 to situations
similar to Brown-Kinney because courts will devote as much
attention to any trend toward oligopoly as they will to defining
the relevant market and standard of illegality.
45 The merger of Brown, the manufacturer, with Kinney, the manufacturer,
was also a horizontal aspect of the merger. However, it was found that
the effects upon competition of this aspect were too insignificant to be pro-
hibited by § 7. Therefore, only the retailer to retailer effects were
considered.46Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962).
47 Id. at 347, 351.4 8 Id. at 344.
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Nevertheless, a relevant market must be determined. It is
important to note that the Court mentioned such factors as inter-
changeability and cross-elasticity, but also ruled that submarkets
were appropriate "lines of commerce." Furthermore, the concept
of the geographic market was a flexible one consisting first of the
nation as a whole, and then of cities with populations of ten
thousand or over.
The standard of illegality was also flexible, for in assessing
the effect of the vertical aspects, the Court felt that the share
of the market foreclosed "will seldom be determinative." 40 Yet
in assessing the effects of the horizontal aspects it was stated that
"the market share which companies may control . . . is one of the
most important factors to be considered ... " 50
Application of Brown Shoe to mergers between small com-
panies in industries in which there is competition may have harm-
ful effects. It may be that size and strength are necessary for
corporations to survive in some industries.5 ' A strict application
may prevent this development.
Whether or not Brown Shoe has brought a degree of stability
to antitrust litigation is clearly open to question. It cannot even
be stated with certainty that Standard Oil's quantitative standard
has been laid to rest. However, one aspect of the decision is
apparent. In the hands of one who fears that business concentra-
tion is unhealthy, Brown Shoe can be a most effective weapon.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - EViDEqcE - POST-ARRAIGNMENT IN-
CRIMINATORY STATEMENTS HELD INADMISSIBLE WHERE DEFEND-
ANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT OBSERVED. - Defendant was
arraigned on charges of first degree robbery, second degree assault
and petit larceny. After arraignment and before indictment, de-
fendant in the absence of counsel- whose presence he had not
requested- made certain voluntary, unsolicited, inculpatory state-
ments to the arresting officer. These statements were received
into evidence at trial over defendant's objection. The Appellate
Division reversed the conviction and the Court of Appeals, in a
4-3 decision, affirming the reversal, held that "any statement made
by an accused after arraignment not in the presence of counsel . . .
is inadmissible." People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 182 N.E.2d
103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (1962).
49 Id. at 328.
50 Id. at 343.
51 See Business Week, June 30, 1962, p. 160.
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